Danske Bank's €200bn money laundering scandal



Eva Jung @EvaJung_ Mechelen, April 2019





The core of the money laundering regulation

• Know your customer, monitor the customers' transactions









Danske Bank

- Denmark's biggest lender.
- Dating back to 1871
- Net profit 2017: 2,7 bn euro
- Headquarters, central Copenhagen
- Bought Finnish Sampo Pank in 2006
- No a proper due diligence. Did not react to warnings.



Bank families recieving the most money

	Trasta Komercbanka							\$3.214.890.365	
🧱 🥪	Privatbank				\$1.955.8	89.763			
	Danske Bank			\$1.208.886.397					
* 📩	Bank of China	\$7	716.931.790						
	Baltikums Bank AS	\$7	01.834.902						
	Rosevrobank	\$576.3	371.830						
	HSBC	\$545.29	97.263						
1	Hellenic Bank Public Company LTD	\$529.10	1.201						
3 2	BC Moldiconbank S.A.	\$436.876.1	22						
	Emirates NBD Bank PJSC	\$357.130.391							
+	CBH Compagnie Bancaire Helvetique SA	\$287.351.865							
•	ABLV Bank AS	\$281.880.005							
	AS Latvijas Biznesa Banka	\$188.626.508							
V	Eurobank Cyprus LTD	\$177.733.784							
	Versobank	\$164.243.978							
	Values shown in millions of USD \rightarrow 0	і і о 500	I 1.000	ı 1.500	ا 2.000	ı 2.500	I 3.000	ı 3.500	4.000

First signs of suspicious transactions

Danske Bank Estonia:

1.554 transactions / Almost €1 bn

Analysing the data

- Non resident customers
- Companies offshore/offshore ownerships
- Beneficial owners real or fake
- Real company?
- Adresses in office hotels in UK or NZ
- Do official figures fit?

- 12
- Suspicious transaction flows: money to and from offshores daily, very large, even sums, fake purposes, money to PEPs.



LCM Alliance LLP

- British office hotel 2.158 other
- Real owners hidden behind companies in the seychelles.
- Ali Moulaye, Iranian dentist, living here in Belgium. He had 127 positions as beneificial owner in the UK.
- Accounts = no activity
- Banking statements = hundred of millions of euros.
- No activity: No factory, no shops, no employees, website etc.

13



Berlingske

kr. 35,00 | Uge 12 | Nr. 80

Mere end syv milliarder kroner, der ifølge flere landes myndigheder stammer fra kriminalitet, er mellem 2010 og 2014 blevet kanaliseret via konti i **Danske Bank** og **Nordea** til lyssky selskaber i skattely. Det viser unikke bankdata, som Berlingske har fået adgang til. Ifølge flere eksperter kan bankerne have brudt loven om hvidvask. Finanstilsynet går nu ind i sagen.

BUSINESS.04-08

firsdag 21.03.2017 | 3 sektioner |







Vi har ikke haft styr nok

på den her type af kunder

og ikke været gode nok til

at overvåge mistænkelige

transaktioner i den

66

GRUNDLAGT 1749 AFE, H. BERLING

- »We haven't had sufficient control over this type of customer and we have failed to monitor suspicious transactions in the Estonian branch. We have since corrected this, but it took to long to close down these activities. Status now is that all but one of these customer relationships have been settled, « said Flemming Pristed. General Counsel at Danske Bank.
- "We reacted clearly and constructively when we noticed this in 2014." CEO Thomas Borgen, March 2017

Two big questions

- What had been going on in Danske Bank Estonia? Who were the customers, how big the transactions, where did the money go?
- What did the bank and authorities suspect/know and do about this knowledge?

Contacting and protecting sources

• Knocking doors: Think of the traces you leave

Prepare your speech, most important questions, research your source

Bring a letter

Educate your sources

Dansk	e Bank		Danske Bank A/S	Estonia branch Narva mnt 11 15015 Tallinn Estonia		
				6 800 800 FORE EE 2X		
METASTAR INVEST L AZADLIG 146 BAKUU	LP ACCOUNT STA 30.06.2012 - 3 333487040	1.12.2014		1/2016 p.1		
		8704 0004		17.03.2016		
Archive ID Doc.no	Name Details	Account Reference		Amount		
30.07.2012		CHF 30.06.2012	Opening balance	0.00		
1207304441717900	METASTAR INVEST LLP FX PAYMENT XXX41143683 USD/CHF 0.9762			+20 000.00		
1207305021952548	ALAKBAROVA NIGAR	LI9408800000023039883	3	-10 000.00		
157 1207305026438308 158		LI810880000023018098	3	-10 000.00		

First thoughts

- 1. Big international potential
- 2. A lot of work

Partners for the Azerbaijani Laundromat

Berlingske

• OCCRP.org

- Süddeutsche Zeitung
- The Guardian
- Äripäev (Estonia)
- Le Monde
- De Tijd (Belgium)
- Barron's (USA)

- Novaya Gazeta (Russia)
- České centrum pro
 Investigativní žurnalistiku
- Bivol (Bulgaria)
- Atlatszo (Hungary)
- 🔍 Delo (Slovenia)
- Dossier (Austria)
- Tages-Anzeiger (Switzerland)

Money from the dictatorship

Directly from the regime:

- MODIAR (Ministry of Defence Industry of Azerbaijan Republic).
- Ministry of Emergency Situations.
- Special State Protection Service (refers directly to the president).
- Bank accounts in the International bank of Azerbaijan

Companies with ties to the regime:

- Baktelekom MMC, connected to form
- Goknur Baki.
- Azarbaycan Metanol Kompani.
- Arash Medical Company.

HILUX SERVICES LP S.VURGUNA 112 AZ1007 BAKU	ACCOUNT STATEMEN 30.06.2012 - 31.12. 333516150001		1/2016 p.212
ASERBATTOHAN	ter EE12 3300 3335 1615	0001	17.03.2016
Archive ID Doc.no	Name Details	Account Reference	Amount
08.01.2014		USD 08.01.2014	
09.01.2014		08.01.2014 Credit turnove 08.01.2014 Debit turnove 08.01.2014 Balanc	r -6 058 157.48
1401085101288436 C145318BBK010814	MODIAR 1401085101288436 INV HS-04/02-36 26 12 13 FULL PAYM FOR DELIVERING OF MACHINES AND EQUI PMENT CONTR 04/02-36 DD	TXID/AZ/1700986181	+8 565 906.50
1401095102469184	16 12 2013 /FEE/USD53,5 BAKTELEKOM MMC	AZ18IBAZ40150018404004037267	+3 178 946.50
C251795BBK010914 1401095074061416 45	1401095102469184 CONTRACT NO1 29.05.2013 /FEE/USD53,5 FABERLEX LP 1401095074061416 PAYMENT TO THE CONTRACT N 439 DD.01.12. 2013	EE683300333516210006	+984 600.00
1401095106930712 C255449BBK010914	BAKTELEKOM MMC 1401095106930712 CONTRACT N01 29.05.2013 /FEE/USD48,5	AZ18IBAZ40150018404004037267	+401 951.50
1401090002956410	Swift koopia ja väljastamise teenustasu: 140109502629789		-2.18
1401090003209168	Danske Bank A/S Estonia branch Swift koopia ja väljastamise teenustasu: 140109502052558		-2.18
1401090004011466	Danske Bank A/S Estonia branch Swift koopia ja väljastamise teenustasu: 140109502732074		-2.18
1401090004650522	Danske Bank A/S Estonia branch Swift koopia ja väljastamise teenustasu: 140109502611356		20.18

"Looks like bribery"

European politicians and officials:

- Eduard Lintner, CSU, German politician and election monitor.
- Kalin Mitrev, member of board of EBRD, married to head of UNESCO.
- Zmago Jelincic Pleminiti, Slovenian presidential candidate.
- Karin Strentz, Bundestag member, CDU.
- Alain Destexhe, Belgian politician and member of PACE.
- Luca Volontè, Italian politican and member of PACE.





1312185037898064	PARY INTERNATIONAL	LI7908812105030540000	-26 000.00
878	1312185037898064 PAYMENT TO THE CONTRACT N.0018/22 D D.1 9.05.2013 FOR SERVICES		
1312185033409520	VOZRAST GROUP LTD	LV29AIZK0001140096129	-34 197.83
870	1312185033409520 PAYMENT TO THE CONTRACT N 330 DD.01.09.		
1312185032422144	MITREV KALIN	CH8204835077949372000	-40 000.00
881	1312185032422144 PAYMENT TO THE CONTRACT N CHL/01-07 201 3 FOR SUPERVISION SERVICES.		
	EDUARD LINTNER	DE72793200750347175072	-41 000.00
879	1312185036608096 PAYMENT TO THE CONTRACT 0018/22 DD 03.0 6.2013 FOR SERVICES.		21
	0.2013 FOR SERVICES.		

September 2017



First wave of consequences

- European politicians stepped down from Council of Europe
- Thousands took to the streets of Baku
- Investigations in several countries (UK, Bulgaria, Belgium, Estonia)
- Danske Bank decided to start an investigation:

»It will be a comprehensive investigation as the extent of the problems in Estonia is much bigger than we have had any comprehention of. It is worse than we feared, « Thomas Borgen, september 2017

• Regulator also started an investigation

The other big question

• What did the bank and authorities suspect/know and do about this knowledge?

Internal audit, February 2014

- »In relation to above, the Head of International Banking in the branch confirmed verbally (in the presence of all audit team) that the reason underlying beneficial owners are not identified is that it could cause problems for clients if Russian authorities request information, « the auditors wrote in their letter to the top management at Danske Bank.
- »According to this memo the Bank has no full information on the end-client of the Russia based intermediaries. This in our opinion leads to the conclusion that the Estonian Branch is not able to identify the actual source of funds and therefore acts against AML legislatory principles, « the auditors wrote.
- Also stating that the customers were "highly profitable" earning the bank 7,5 million euro in income in 2013 alone.



Whistleblower, December 2013

- Customers allegedly"included the Putin family and FSB"
- "may itself have committed a criminal offence"
- "has likely breached numerous regulatory requirements"
- likely was "helping to launder money"
- pointed to a "near total process failure"

The bank's explanations fell apart

- They said that the banks "own surveillance" had noticed the suspicious payments. Wrong: A whistleblower did.
- The bank reacted "clear and constructively" in 2014 when they found out. Wrong: The cleaning took two years the Estonian authorities has to remind the bank to speed up the process.
- "Nothing pointed towards" employees helping. Wrong: According to the bank's own internal audit employees were deliberately hiding customers.
- The problem was "isolated to Estonia." Wrong: There was also suspicious transactions to Lithuania

Danske Bank's own investigation



- In total 15.000 suspicious customers between 2007 og 2015
- Transactions worth 200 billion via non-residents. "Large part" was suspicious.
- Impossible to confirm the extent of actual money laundering, But "large part."
- CEO Thomas Borgen steps down.

New information

 In 2007, the Estonian FSA came out with a critical inspection report, and at the same time Danske Bank at Group level received specific information from the Russian Central Bank, through the Danish FSA. This information pointed to possible "tax and custom payments evasion" and "criminal activity in its pure form, including money laundering", estimated at "billions of rubles monthly".

Consequences from authorities

- Financial/criminal police investigating in Danmark, Estonia, France, US.
 Several class action law suits coming up in US
- EU asked EBA to investigate role of Danish and Estonians authorities. Still questions to answer.
- Danish authorities opened investigation of audit firm E&Y.
- Laws changed for future cases. 8 doubling fines: €400 million today, longer jail sentences, cool of time etc.
- Also: Stock looses 47 percent of its value in 2018: €13 billion

Consequences for people

• CEO Thomas Borgen steps down

• Around 10 others in top management positions in Denmark and Estonian step down

• Henrik Ramlau Hansen, chairman of Financial Regulator steps down.

Danske Bank thrown out of Estonia: Pack you stuff within 8 months (or daily fines of 100.000 euro)

Consequences last week

- First primiliminary charges against 9-10 people in top management. Former CEO and former head of regulator. Homes searched.
- Preliminary charges against 12 people in Estonia: 11 for possible money laundering, 1 for bribery
- This week new CEO for Danske: former ABN AMRO banker Chris Vogelzang from Netherlands

"Integrity." "Moral compass."





"With positions entrusted with power comes a special responsibility and a special duty to do ones best. It makes me sad if moral is sliding. What will happen then to common decency? One should know the difference between yours and mine, between right and wrong"

Swedbank

- February 2019: Uppdrag Granskning/Mission Investigate reveal
- Suspicious cash flowed through Swedbank in Estonia. \$4.30 billion.
- Case exploded. 135 billion euros poured through the banks high risc non resident portfolio
- CEO Bonnesen steps down, chairman as well

Questions?

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